Fear of floating by Reinhart, Carmen & Calvo, Guillermo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Fear of floating
Carmen Reinhart and Guillermo Calvo
University of Maryland, College Park, Department of Economics
May 2002
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14000/
MPRA Paper No. 14000, posted 11. March 2009 16:03 UTC
Fear of floating 
Guillermo A. Calvo 
InterAmerican Development Bank and NBER 
Carmen M. Reinhart 
International Monetary Fund and NBER 
First draft: January 12, 2000 
A revised version of this paper was published in: 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. CXVII No. 2, May 2002, 379-408.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many emerging market countries have suffered financial crises. One view blames soft 
pegs for these crises.  Adherents to that view suggest that countries move to corner solutions--
hard pegs or floating exchange rates. We analyze the behavior of exchange rates, reserves, and 
interest rates to assess whether there is evidence that country practice is moving toward corner 
solutions. We focus on whether countries that claim they are floating are indeed doing so. We 
find that countries that say they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not--there seems to 
be an epidemic case of “fear of floating.” 
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 I. Introduction 
Since the Asian financial crisis and the subsequent crises in Russia, Brazil, and Turkey, 
many observers have suggested that intermediate exchange rate regimes are vanishing and that 
countries around the world are being driven toward corner solutions.  The bipolar solutions are 
either hard pegs--such as currency boards, dollarization, or currency unions--or freely-floating 
exchange rate regimes. 1  On the surface, at least, this statement accords with recent trends.  
Twelve countries in Europe chose to give up their national currencies, while Ecuador was the 
first of what may be several countries in Latin America to adopt the United States dollar as its 
official national tender. More recently, El Salvador has also moved in that direction.  At the 
other end of the spectrum, South Korea, Thailand, Brazil, Russia, Chile, Colombia, Poland, and, 
more recently, Turkey have announced their intentions to allow their currencies to float.  Hence, 
on the basis of labels, at least, it would appear that currency arrangements are increasingly bi-
polar.  
In this paper, we investigate whether countries are, indeed, moving as far to the corners 
as official labels suggest. Since verifying the existence of a hard peg is trivial, our focus is on the 
other end of the flexibility spectrum.  Specifically, we examine whether countries that claim they 
are floating their currency are, indeed, doing so. We analyze the behavior of exchange rates, 
foreign exchange reserves, and interest rates across the spectrum of exchange rate arrangements 
to assess whether the official labels provide an adequate representation of actual country 
practice.  The data spans monthly observations for thirty-nine countries during the January 1970-
                                                 
1. For recent interesting discussions of the corner solution hypothesis, see Frankel, Schmukler, and 
Servén [2001] and Fischer [2001].  Obstfeld and Rogoff [1995], who stress the increased difficulty of 
maintaining a peg in the face of rising capital mobility, also anticipate many of these issues. 
 
 2 
November 1999 period. One-hundred-and-fifty-five exchange rate arrangements are covered in 
this sample. 
The paper proceeds as follows:  In Section II, we provide descriptive statistics for 
exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves, and money market interest rates.  We then compare 
the behavior of these variables across different exchange rate arrangements.  In Section III, we 
present a simple model that replicates several of the key stylized facts in these data; this 
framework explains why a country might prefer a smooth exchange rate as a result of the 
combined roles of inflation targeting and low credibility.  In the section that follows, we 
introduce an exchange rate flexibility index motivated by the model.  This index is meant to 
provide a multivariate summary measure of the degree of exchange rate flexibility in each 
episode--hence, it enables us to compare each episode to the benchmark of some of the more 
committed floaters and see whether the actual country practices match official labels.  The 
concluding section touches on some of the implications of our findings. 
 
II. Fear of Floating:  The Stylized Evidence 
Our data is monthly and spans January 1970-November 1999.  Thirty-nine countries in 
Africa, Asia, Europe, and Western Hemisphere constitute our sample.  The countries are 
Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cote D’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, the United States, and Venezuela. 
One-hundred-and-fifty-five exchange rate arrangements are covered in this sample. Our analysis, 
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however, does not give equal attention to all regimes.  In the earlier part of the sample, there 
were pervasive capital controls which make these episodes less relevant for the purposes of 
comparison to the present environment of high capital mobility. Also, a few of the floating 
exchange rate episodes occur during hyperinflations, which also complicate comparisons.  Our 
choice of countries was, in part, constrained by the need to be able to parallel official exchange 
arrangements as reported by the International Monetary Fund, and by data limitations, 
particularly as regards market-determined interest rates.2 However, most regions have adequate 
coverage and both developed and developing countries are well represented in the sample. 3 
In addition to bilateral exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves, we also focus on 
the time series properties of nominal and real ex-post interest rates. The bilateral exchange rate is 
end-of-period.  Whenever possible, the interest rates used is that most closely identified with 
monetary policy; if these are not available a treasury bill rate is used. The data appendix provides 
the details on a country-by-country basis. Our desire for a long sample covering many countries 
precludes using higher frequency data.  Relatively few countries report foreign exchange reserve 
data on a daily or weekly basis and for many of those that do it is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  Interest rates are included in the analysis because many countries, particularly in 
recent years, routinely use interest rate policy to smooth exchange fluctuations--the use of 
interest rate policy to smooth exchange rate fluctuations in the context of an inflation target is an 
                                                 
2. While data on exchange rates and reserves are readily available for a much larger set of developing 
countries, data on interest rates poses a problem in many cases, as it is riddled with large gaps and 
discontinuities. 
3. Many small countries in Africa and Western Hemisphere with a long history of fixed exchange 
rates (for instance, the CFA Franc Zone) are not well represented in our sample.  As we are primarily 
interested in verifying whether countries that are currently (or previously) classified as floaters or 
managed floaters behave like the truly committed floaters, this does not seem like a serious omission. 
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issue we take up in the next section..  We focus on the behavior of monthly percent changes 
(unless otherwise noted) of each variable, one at a time, and compare these across regimes. 4 
II. 1. Methodology issues 
                                                 
4.  In a longer working paper version of this paper, we also studied the behavior of the monetary 
aggregates, real ex-post interest rates, and primary commodity prices [see Calvo and Reinhart, 2000]. 
  
It is widely accepted that a “pure float” is an artifact of economics textbooks.  Yet, 
despite occasional instances of foreign exchange market intervention, sometimes even in co-
ordinated fashion, the United States dollar, US $, floated about as freely against the German 
Deutschemark, DM, (and now the euro) and the Japanese Yen, ¥, as any currency has ever been 
allowed to float. Thus, if the only criteria was the extent of  commitment to float their currencies, 
the G-3 are the best candidates to serve as a benchmark for comparing whether countries that 
claim they float are indeed doing so.  However, the wealthy G-3 countries all share the common 
feature that (in varying degrees) their currencies are the world’s reserve currencies, which 
somewhat reduces their value as benchmarks for smaller industrial nations and, especially, for 
emerging market economies.  However, another comparator is also available: Australia, with a 
credible commitment to floating, shares some features of the other smaller industrial nations and 
developing countries that make up the lion’s share of our sample.  For example, the Australian 
dollar is not a world reserve currency and Australia continues to rely heavily on primary 
commodity exports, like many of the developing countries in our sample.  As a consequence of 
the latter, its terms of trade exhibit a higher volatility than those of the G-3 and it is more 
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representative of the characteristics of many of the non-G-3 countries in our study.  Giving 
weight to both criteria (committment to floating and shared characteristics) we opted to use both 
Australia and the G-3 as benchmarks. 
Our strategy is to compare what countries say and what they do.  What they say is 
reported to the  IMF, which classifies countries into four types of exchange rate arrangements: 
peg, limited flexibility, managed floating and, freely-floating.  Limited flexibility has, almost 
exclusively, been used to classify European countries (prior to the monetary union) with 
exchange rate arrangements vìs-a-vìs one another (i.e., the Snake, the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, etc.). 
What countries do can be described by the movement in their asset prices.  Unless 
otherwise noted, the bilateral exchange rates are reported with respect to the DM for European 
countries and with respect to the United States dollar for everyone else.  The choice of the DM 
owes to the fact that this was the most prominent reserve currency in Europe and, as Germany 
was the low inflation country for many years, the anchor for currencies in that region.  For the 
remaining countries, the dollar is the usual anchor currency of choice.  Indeed, the largest share 
of emerging market’s external debt is denominated in U.S. dollars and world trade is 
predominantly invoiced in U.S. dollars.   
We denote the absolute value of the percent change in the exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserves by ε, ΔF/F, respectively.  The absolute value of the change in the interest rate, 
it - it-1 , is given by Δi.   Letting xc denote some critical threshold, we can estimate the probability 
that the variable, x , (where x , can be ε, ΔF/F, and Δ i ), falls within some pre-specified bounds, 
conditional on a particular type of exchange rate arrangement.  For example, if xc  is arbitrarily 
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set at 2.5 percent, then, the probability that the monthly exchange rate change falls within the 
two-and-a-half percent band should be greatest for the fixed exchange regimes and lowest for the 
freely floating arrangements, with the other two types of currency regimes positioned in the 
middle.  In our notation, for x = ε, we should observe  
 P(x  < xc ⏐ Peg) > P(x  < xc  ⏐ Float) for x  =  ε. 
Because shocks to money demand and expectations when the exchange rate is fixed are 
accommodated through purchases and sales of foreign exchange reserves, the opposite pattern 
should prevail for changes in foreign exchange reserves.  Hence, for x = ΔF/F,  
 P(x  < xc  ⏐ Peg) < P(x  < xc  ⏐ Float).   
Thus, the probability that changes in reserves fall within a relatively narrow band is a decreasing 
function of the degree of exchange rate rigidity, as money demand shocks and changes in 
expectations are accommodated to prevent a change in the exchange rate. 
Theory provides less clear-cut predictions as to how the volatility of interest rates could 
covary with the extent of exchange rate flexibility.  Interest rates could fluctuate considerably if 
the monetary authorities actively use interest rate policy as a means of stabilizing the exchange 
rate--an issue which we will explore more formally in a simple setting in the next section.  But 
policy is only a partial source of interest rate volatility.  Interest rates are bound to be volatile if 
expectations about future inflation or exchange rate changes are unanchored, as is the case when 
the authorities lack credibility. Hence, the likelihood of observing relatively large fluctuations in 
interest rates would depend on both the degree of credibility and on the policymakers reaction 
function.  
While we also consider other statistical exercises in Section IV, examining the 
 probabilities that the variable of interest stays within a pre-specified band has some definite 
advantages over alternative descriptive statistics.  First, it avoids the problem of outliers that can 
distort variances.  For example, it is not uncommon in this sample (particularly for countries with 
capital controls or in the earlier part of the sample) to have a crawling peg exchange rate for an 
extended period of time (hence, some degree of exchange rate flexibility), with some periodic 
large devaluations (upward of 100 percent is not unusual) and return to a crawl.  Brazil in the 
1970s is a good example of this type of policy. 5  Short-lived inflationary spikes create similar 
problems for interest rates.  Secondly, the probabilistic nature of the statistic conveys information 
about the underlying frequency distribution that is not apparent from the variance.  
II.2.  Measuring Volatility: Exchange Rates and Reserves  
Tables 1-2 present evidence on the frequency distribution of monthly percent changes in 
the exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves, and nominal money-market interest rates for recent 
or current exchange rate regimes that are classified as freely floating regimes and managed 
floaters; Appendix Table 1 presents the comparable statistics for limited flexibility arrangements 
and peg episodes.  The first column lists the country, the second the dates of the particular 
exchange arrangement, and the remaining columns the relevant probability for changes in the 
exchange rate, international reserves, and interest rates, in that order.  For exchange rates and 
foreign exchange reserves, our chosen threshold value is  xc = 2.5 percent, which is a 
comparatively narrow band.  For instance, following the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis many 
European countries adopted a +/- 15 percent band for the exchange rate.  Chile, until recently, had 
                                                 
5. As another example, the variance of the monthly exchange rate change over Pakistan’s pegged 
episode, which ended on December 1981, was 119.42; excluding a single monthly observation (the 
devaluation of May 1972) the variance plummets to 0.85.  Some of the problems with the alternative 
exchange rate classification proposed by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger [1999] rests on their heavy 
reliance on second moments distorted by outliers. 
 comparable bands.  Other examples include Mexico (prior to December 1994) which had in place 
an “ever-widening” band, as the lower end (appreciation) of the band was fixed and the upper 
ceiling (depreciation) was crawling; Israel and Colombia (994-1998) also had wide bands.  6  
Table 1. Volatility of Selected Indicators in Recent or Current “Floating” Exchange Rate Regimes  
 
Probability that the monthly  change is 
 
 within a +/- 2.5 percent  band: 
 
 greater than +/- 4 percent 
 (400 basis points): 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exchange 
Rate 
 
 
Reserves 
 
 
 Nominal interest rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
Australia 
 
January 1984-November 1999 
 
70.3 
 
50.0 
 
0.0 
 
Bolivia 
 
September 1985-December 1997 
 
93.9 
 
19.6 
 
14.8 
 
Canada 
 
June 1970-November 1999 
 
93.6 
 
36.6 
 
2.8 
 
India 
 
March 1993-November 1999 
 
93.4 
 
50.0 
 
23.8 
 
Kenya 
 
October 1993-December 1997 
 
72.2 
 
27.4 
 
15.7 
 
Japan 
 
February 1973-November 1999 
 
61.2 
 
74.3 
 
0.0 
 
Mexico 
 
December 1994-November 1999 
 
63.5 
 
28.3 
 
37.7 
 
New Zealand 
 
March 1985-November 1999 
 
72.2 
 
31.4 
 
1.8 
 
Nigeria 
 
October 1986-March 1993 
 
74.5 
 
12.8 
 
1.4 
 
Norway 
 
December 1992-December 1994 
 
95.8 
 
51.9 
 
4.1 
 
Peru 
 
August 1990-November 1999 
 
71.4 
 
48.1 
 
31.4 
 
Philippines 
 
January 1988-November 1999 
 
74.9 
 
26.1 
 
1.5 
 
South Africa 
 
January 1983-November 1999 
 
66.2 
 
17.4 
 
0.5 
 
Spain 
 
January 1984-May 1989 
 
93.8 
 
40.1 
 
4.1 
 
Sweden 
 
November 1992-November 1999 
 
75.5 
 
33.3 
 
1.3 
 
Uganda 
 
January 1992-November 1999 
 
77.9 
 
32.9 
 
3.6 
 
United States$/DM 
 
 
February 1973-November 1999 
 
58.7 
 
62.2 
 
0.3 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
                                                 
6. In a longer working paper version, we also report comparable statistics for a +/- one percent band. 
  
 
 
 Table 2. Volatility of Selected Indicators in “Managed Floating” Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 
Probability that the monthly change is 
 
 in a +/- 2.5 percent band: 
 
 greater than +/- 4 percent: 
 
Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exchange Rate 
 
Reserves 
 
Nominal interest rate 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
Bolivia 
 
January 1998-November 1999 
 
100.0 
 
12.5 
 
0.0 
 
Brazil 
 
July 1994-December 1998 
 
94.3 
 
51.8 
 
25.9 
 
Chile 
 
October 1982-November 1999 
 
83.8 
 
48.2 
 
51.2 
 
Colombia 
 
January 1979-November 1999 
 
86.8 
 
54.2 
 
2.9 
 
Egypt 
 
February 1991-December 1998 
 
98.9 
 
69.4 
 
0.0 
 
Greece 
 
January 1977-December 1997 
 
85.3 
 
28.9 
 
0.7 
 
India 
 
February 1979-November 1993 
 
84.5 
 
36.7 
 
11.2 
 
Indonesia 
 
November 1978-June 1997 
 
99.1 
 
41.5 
 
5.2 
 
Israel 
 
December 1991-November 
1999 
 
90.9 
 
43.8 
 
1.1 
 
Kenya 
 
January 1998-November 1999 
 
70.6 
 
14.3 
 
1.1 
 
Korea 
 
March 1980-October 1997 
 
97.6 
 
37.7 
 
0.0 
 
Malaysia 
 
December 1992-September 
1998 
 
81.2 
 
55.7 
 
2.9 
 
Mexico 
 
January 1989-November 1994 
 
95.7 
 
31.9 
 
13.9 
 
Norway 
 
January 1995-November 1999 
 
90.2 
 
42.3 
 
0.0 
 
Pakistan 
 
January 1982-November 1999 
 
92.8 
 
12.1 
 
14.1 
 
Singapore 
 
January 1988-November 1999 
 
88.9 
 
74.8 
 
0 
 
Turkey 
 
January 1980-November 1999 
 
36.8 
 
23.3 
 
61.4 
 
Uruguay 
 
January 1993-November 1999 
 
92.0 
 
36.5 
 
60.1 
 
Venezuela 
 
 
April 1996-November 1999 
 
93.9 
 
29.4 
 
n.a. 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
For the United States, for example, as shown in column 3 of Table 1, there is about a 59 
percent probability that the monthly US $/DM exchange rate change would fall within a 
 relatively narrow plus/minus 2½ percent band.  For the $/¥ exchange rate, that probability is 
slightly higher, at 61 percent.  By contrast, for Bolivia, Canada, and India (all declared floaters 
during that period), the probability of staying within the band is around 95 percent--significantly 
above the benchmark of Australia, where the comparable probability is about 70 percent. 5 Put in 
another way, there is only about a five percent probability in those three countries that the 
exchange rate will change more than two-and-a-half percent on any given month.  On average, 
for this group of  floaters, the probability that the exchange rate change is contained in this 
moderate plus/minus two-and-a-half-percent band is over 79 percent--significantly above that for 
Australia, Japan, and the United States. The t-statistic for the difference in means test is 3.38 
with a probability value of (0.00) under the null hypothesis of no difference.   By this metric, 
post-crisis Mexico approximates a float more closely than any of the other cases--including 
Canada. 7 8 
                                                 
7.  The variance of the monthly changes Mexican peso/US $ is about twice as large as the variance of 
the monthly changes in the ¥/US $ exchange rate [see Calvo and Reinhart, 2001]. 
8. For a study of Peru’s fear of floating, see Morón, Goñi, and Ormeño [1999], who estimate an 
implicit intervention band.  For a discussion on East Asia’s Dollar Standard, see McKinnon [1999]. 
Moderate-to-large monthly fluctuations in the exchange rate are even rarer among the so-
called “managed float” episodes (Table 2).  For Egypt and Bolivia, the probability of a monthly 
exchange rate change greater than two-and-a-half percent is nil--as was the case for Indonesia 
and Korea up to the 1997 crisis.  Even for self-proclaimed flexible-rate advocates, such as Chile 
and Singapore, the frequency distribution of their monthly exchange rate fluctuations relative to 
the U.S. dollar do not vaguely resemble that of Australia, let alone the US$/DM or US $/¥.  Even 
a casual inspection reveals that a significantly higher proportion of observations falls within the 
two-and-a-half percent band. On average, there is an 88 percent probability that managed 
 floaters’ monthly changes in the exchange rate are confined to this narrow band. This exchange 
rate stability versus the US dollar (or DM if it is a European country) is surprising in light of the 
fact that for many emerging market countries during these episodes, inflation rates were well 
above U.S. or German levels, terms-of-trade shocks were frequent and large, and 
macroeconomic fundamentals were markedly more volatile than in any of the benchmark 
countries.  Not surprisingly, the evidence presented in Appendix Table 1 shows that for limited 
flexibility arrangements and for pegs the probabilities that exchange rate changes are confined to 
this band are even greater, at 92 and 95 percent, respectively.  Hence, the observed behavior 
accords with the priors that exchange rate variability is least for pegs and greatest for floaters.  
For the Float-Peg difference, the means test the probability value is (0.00); for the Float-
Managed, it is (0.04); for the Managed-Limited flexibility, the means test the probability value is 
(0.32) while for the Limited flexibility-Peg it is (0.44).  
Yet, we cannot glean from exchange rates alone what would have been the extent of 
exchange rate fluctuations in the absence of policy interventions--that is, we do not observe the 
counterfactual.  To assess the extent of policy intervention to smooth out exchange rate 
fluctuations, we next examine the behavior of foreign exchange reserves.  In principle, the 
variance of reserves should be zero in a pure float.  The reality, however, it is not that simple, as 
reserves may change owing to fluctuations in valuation and the accrual of interest earnings. 9  
However, even absent these, there are other factors that influence changes in reserves.  First, 
there are “hidden” foreign exchange reserves transactions.  Credit lines may be used to defend 
                                                 
9. For instance, in the case of New Zealand reserves fluctuate owing to the Treasury’s management of 
its overseas currency debt rather that foreign exchange market intervention.  We thank Governor 
Brash (in personal correspondence) for pointing this out. 
 the exchange rate during periods of speculative pressures.  Indeed, several European countries 
made ample use of their lines of credit during the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of 
1992-93. Central banks may engage in derivative transactions, much along the lines of Thailand 
in 1997, which borrowed dollars in the futures market, or issue debt denominated in a foreign 
currency, such as Brazil among others.  These transactions hide the true level and variation in 
reserves.   Secondly, even in the absence of any “hidden” reserve transactions, countries may 
rely more heavily on domestic open market operations and interest rate changes to limit 
exchange rate. 
Column (4) of Tables 1-2 summarize the frequency distribution of monthly foreign 
exchange reserve changes (in U.S. dollars).  With the exception of the United States and the few 
European countries in the sample, most countries represented in Tables 1-2 hold most of their 
foreign exchange reserve holdings in dollar-denominated assets, hence, for this group valuation 
changes are not much of an issue. 10  As Table 1 shows, there is about a 74 percent probability 
that Japan’s monthly changes in foreign exchange reserves falls in a plus/minus two-and-a-half 
percent band, while for Australia the comparable probability is 50 percent.  Yet, in the case of 
Mexico, there is only a 28 percent probability that changes in foreign exchange reserves are that 
small, while in the case of Bolivia that probability is even lower; note that for post-crisis 
Thailand there is only a 6 percent probability that reserves changes are inside the band.11  
                                                 
10. One may also want to construct an estimate of interest earned by the reserve holdings and adjust 
the reported stocks accordingly. This is work in progress. 
11. So while monthly changes in the Mexican peso/US $ exchange rate are almost twice as variable 
as monthly changes in the ¥/US $ rate--changes in Mexico’s reserves are 18 times as volatile as 
changes in U.S. reserves and 25 times as variable as changes in Japan’s reserves and more than four 
times as volatile as Argentina’s reserves. 
 Indeed, for all other countries, large swings in foreign exchange reserves appear to be 
commonplace, consistent with a higher extent of intervention in the foreign exchange market-- 
relative to what is to be expected a priori from a freely floating exchange rate regime. Nor is this 
exclusively an emerging market phenomenon--Canada’s reserve changes are about seven times 
as volatile as that of the United States.  For the group of “floaters” the average probability 
(shown in the right hand panel of Figure 1) is about 34 percent--about one-half the Japan-U.S. 
average and significantly below the Australian benchmark. The difference is statistically 
significant.  Indeed, the observed behavior of international reserves runs  counter to our priors--
P(ΔF/F, < xc  ⏐ Peg) < P(ΔF/F, < xc ⏐Float).  We find that reserve variability is highest for the 
“floaters” and least for the limited flexibility arrangements.   This point is made starkly in the top 
panel of Figure 1, which plots the probability that the monthly exchange rate change lies within a 
2 ½ percent band (along the horizontal axis) and the probability that foreign exchange reserves 
change more that 2 ½ percent (along the vertical axis) for the four currency regimes and our 
three comparators.  Two points are evident.  First, the range of observed exchange rate variation 
is quite narrow, with all four regimes associated with a higher chance of changing in a narrow 
band than any of the three benchmarks.  Second, the smoothness in the exchange rate seems to 
be the result of explicit policy choice: International reserves move more from month to month 
for those countries with the more stable exchange rates. 
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United States 
 
 
      Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Float 
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        Peg 
United 
States      Japan       Australia    Limited 
 
 
 
      SOURCE: Tables 1 and 2 and Appendix Table 1. 
 III. 3.  Interest Rate Volatility, Lack of Credibility, and Monetary Policy  
As discussed earlier, policy intervention to dampen exchange rate fluctuations is not 
limited purchases and sales of foreign exchange.  Interest rates in the United States,  Japan, 
Australia, and other developed economies are usually set with domestic considerations in mind. 
Yet, in many of the other countries in our sample, the authorities who set domestic interest rates 
accord a much higher weight to the stabilization of the exchange rate–particularly when there are 
credibility problems and/or a high pass-through from exchange rates to prices. This is also the 
case for countries which have inflation targets and have a high pass-through from exchange rates 
to prices, which is the case we model in Section III.  For evidence, that pass-through tends to be 
higher for emerging markets, see Calvo and Reinhart [2001].  This policy, coupled with 
credibility problems, may help explain the high relative volatility of  interest rates in these 
countries. As shown in Table 1, while the probability that interest rates change by 400 basis 
points (four percent) or more on any given month is about zero for Australia, Japan, and the 
United States, that probability is close to 40 percent for Mexico and about 30 percent for Peru 
and India (among the floaters).  Nominal and real interest rates in India are about four times as 
variable as in the United States; for Mexico, interest rates are about 20 times as variable--Peru 
holds the record. 12  A recent example of Chile and Mexico’s use of high interest rates as a 
means to limiting exchange rate pressures (despite a markedly slowing economy and an adverse 
terms-of-trade shock) comes from the aftermath of the Russian crisis in August of 1998.  At the 
time of this writing, Brazil’s central bank hiked interest rates in the midst of a recession and an 
energy crisis to halt the slide of its currency, the real. 
                                                 
12. See Calvo and Reinhart [2000] for details. 
 These examples, however, are not unique in emerging markets.  Among the managed 
floaters (Table 2), other emerging markets, including Brazil, Turkey and Uruguay have an 
equally high or higher incidence of large fluctuations in interest rates. While in the case of 
Turkey and Uruguay, it is at least partially owing to their comparatively high inflation rates, that 
is  not the case for the others.  The picture painted by the volatility of real ex-post interest rates 
quite similar.13 
When comparing  the four types of exchange rate regimes, interest rates are the most 
stable for the limited flexibility group--which is almost exclusively made up of European 
developed countries--and least stable for the managed floating group, which is predominantly 
comprised of developing countries.14  Indeed, Calvo and Reinhart [2001] show that the variance 
of interest rates in low inflation in emerging markets is about four times that of developed 
economies–and that gap is far greater for countries with a history of inflation. 
                                                 
13. See the working paper version of this paper.  
14. It is important to note that some countries with a highly regulated financial sector and limited 
capital mobility simultaneously show exchange rate and interest rate stability; examples include, 
Egypt, India (in the earlier managed floating period), Kenya, and Nigeria. 
Moreover, such interest volatility is not the result of adhering to strict monetary targets in 
the face of large and frequent money demand shocks.  In reality, most of these countries do not 
have explicit or implicit money supply rules.  Interest rate volatility would appear to be the 
byproduct of a combination of trying to stabilize the exchange rate through domestic open 
market operations and lack of credibility.    These findings are summarized in the lower panel of 
Figure 1, which plots the relative probabilities of small changes in the exchange rate (again, 
along the horizontal axis) and large changes in the nominal interest rate (the vertical axis).  As is 
evident, the countries that move theri interest rates the most are those that, by self identification, 
 would seem to have to move them the least--those that follow a float or a managed float. 
4. General Observations About the Findings 
In this section, we have presented evidence that the variability in international reserves 
and  interest rates is high relative to the variations in the exchange rate. Taken together, these 
findings would suggest that in many cases the authorities are attempting to stabilize the exchange 
rate through both direct intervention in the foreign exchange market and open market operations. 
 Furthermore, “fear of floating” does not appear to be limited to a particular region.  Indeed, it 
would appear that in emerging markets floating has been largely confined to brief periods 
following currency crisis or chaotic episodes of high inflation--an issue we examine in greater 
detail in Section IV. In the next section we develop a simple framework that replicates these 
stylized facts and provides a rationale for fear of floating.   
 
 III.  Inflation Targeting, Lack of Credibility, and Fear of Floating 
There are multiple reasons why countries may be reluctant to tolerate much variation in 
their exchange rates.15  Liability dollarization, which is pervasive in emerging markets, may 
produce a fear of floating.  In Lahiri and Végh’s [2001] model, fear of floating arises because 
there is an output cost associated with exchange rate fluctuations; in the Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy [2001] setting, an inelastic supply of external funds at times of crises explains 
exchange rate overshooting and fear of floating.  Calvo and Reinhart [2001] stress concerns 
about lack of credibility and loss of access to international capital markets. 
                                                 
15.  See also Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein [2001]. 
 In this paper, we present a simple model where fear of floating arises from the 
combination of lack of credibility (as manifested in large and frequent risk-premia shocks), a 
high pass-through from exchange rates to prices, and inflation targeting.  It is worth pointing out 
that lack of credibility in this setting is not manifested in first moments.  Lack of credibility is 
associated with the (higher) variance of the risk premia shocks.  This setting is motivated by the 
recent trend in emerging markets to couple floating with explicit inflation targets.  Indeed, at 
present, this combination appears to have become the most popular alternative to fixing the 
exchange rate. 16   
Explanations of a central bank’s choice of the expansion of nominal magnitudes have 
often framed as some variant of Barro and Gordon’s [1983] rules-versus-discretion model, 
whether allowing for uncertainty [as in Canzoneri, 1985], heterogeneity among potential central 
bankers [as in Rogoff, 1985], or even electoral choice among central bankers [as in Alesina and 
Grilli, 1992].  Policy is cast as attempting to reconcile the long-run benefits of low inflation with 
the temptation to get extra output in the near term by generating an inflation surprise that works 
through a Phillips curve.   
                                                 
16.  Inflation targeters include: Australia (September 1994), Brazil (June 1999), Canada (February 
1991), Colombia (September 1999), Czech Republic (January 1998),  Finland (February 1993-June 
1998), Israel (January 1992), South Korea (January 1998), Switzerland (January 2000), Mexico 
(January 1999), New Zealand (March 1990), Peru (January 1994), Poland (October 1998), South 
Africa (February 2000), Spain (November 1994-June 1998), Sweden (January 1993), Thailand (April 
2000), United Kingdom (October 1992).  The dates in parentheses, which indicate when inflation 
targeting was introduced, highlight that for most of the emerging markets the policy change is 
relatively recent. 
It could be argued that a formulation that describes discretionary monetary policy as 
attempting to exploit a Phillips curve is of little practical relevance for most emerging markets.  
A history of high and variable inflation in many emerging markets has eroded any meaningful 
tradeoff between unemployment and inflation surprises.  Furthermore, even in the absence of a 
 notorious inflation history, the evidence suggests that monetary policy is often procyclical--as 
central banks raise interest rates in bad states of nature to restore investor confidence and stem 
capital outflows. Yet, this does not imply that the central bank is indifferent to inflation 
surprises.  Indeed, in many emerging markets there has been a tendency to use inflation surprises 
to improve the government’s fiscal position.  Over reliance on the inflation tax (and other easy-
to-implement taxes, such as tariffs) may owe to the fact that in many emerging markets tax 
collection is inefficient and evasion rampant.  That is, the benefits to the monetary authority are 
that surprise inflation generates additional revenue from money creation and erodes the real 
value of nominal government debt and public sector wages.  
It could also be argued that the focus on a closed economy controlling the domestic 
inflation rate limits the seeming relevance of Barro-Gordon models for many developed and 
emerging market countries alike.  In fact, central bankers in emerging market economies appear 
to be extremely mindful of external factors in general and the foreign exchange value of their 
currency, in particular.  In what follows, the policy choice explicitly considers the problem of a 
small open economy setting its nominal interest rate.  
Consider one period of an infinitely lived sequence.17  Households make two sets of 
decisions at the start of the period based on incomplete information–that is, before shocks are 
realized.  As workers, they bargain for nominal wages that will prevail over the period in 
anticipation that goods and service price inflation will equal πe.  As investors, they place part of 
their assets at banks in deposits that do not bear interest, implying an opportunity cost that is 
expected to be ie, the market-based return on domestic government debt. 
                                                 
17.   We will suppress time subscripts where possible. 
 Foreign investors also hold domestic debt, with the home interest rate linked to the 
foreign interest rate, i*, by uncovered interest parity.  Defining s to be the price of foreign 
currency in terms of domestic currency so that when s rises (falls), the home currency 
depreciates (appreciates).  If ε is the expected rate of change in the exchange rate, then the 
uncovered interest parity condition holds up to a risk premium, ρ, 
The risk premium is assumed to be a random shock, drawn from a distribution with mean μρ= 0 
and variance σρ2.  To keep notational clutter to a minimum, we will assume that the mean to the 
risk premium shock equals zero. 
From the government’s perspective, the public’s willingness to hold money balances 
must be supported by non-interest-bearing domestic reserves, issued in the amount R.. Because a 
central bank’s balance sheet must balance, these domestic reserves can also be expressed in 
terms of their asset counterparts, foreign exchange reserves and domestic credit. Since the 
central bank can issue R, this implies that it can issue less interest-bearing obligations. This 
interest saving is one measure of the seigniorage from money creation,  
 
where p is the domestic price level.18  Our simplification of a fractional banking system is to 
assume a constant money multiplier, k, so that 
                                                 
18.  In a growing economy, seigniorage would also include the increase in real balances induced as 
income expands. 
. +  + i = i * ρε  
 The demand for domestic real balances is written as a linear approximation, 
M
p
c ie= − +η ζ ,
 
where ζ represents a random shock with mean zero and variance σζ2.  As before, the assumption 
is that households place their balances at banks before the outcome of financial market clearing 
is known.  Thus, the opportunity cost of holding money must be forecasted rather than known 
with certainty. 
As a consequence of this specification of the financial sector, seigniorage can be written: 
i c i
k
e− +η ζ .
 
Notice the key wedge between anticipations and actions opened up in this product:  Seigniorage 
depends on both the expected interest rate (which determines the real stock of reserves) and the 
actual interest rate (which determines the earning rate of those reserves). 
We also assume that foreign and domestic goods, prices at p* and p respectively, are 
perfect substitutes, so that purchasing power parity prevails, 
which completes the description of economic behavior that the central bank takes as given. This, 
of course, implies a passthrough of unity from exchange rate to prices. This assumption can be 
relaxed without altering the qualitative results of the model.  Here we assume that purchasing 
power of parity holds for “the” relevant country in the region; if there were more currencies the 
analysis could also be extended to include less-than-unit passthrough. 
kR. = M  
 ,sp = p *  
 Each period, the central bank is assumed to maximize its welfare, which is increasing in 
its seigniorage and decreasing in the deviation of the inflation rate from its target, with the target 
taken to be zero to save on notation.  This welfare function can be written: 
W i R
p
b= −
2
2π ,
  
where b is a coefficient representing the welfare loss (relative to one unit more of seigniorage) 
from inflation deviating from its target in either direction. 
The two parity conditions combine to explain domestic inflation in terms of domestic 
nominal interest rates and variables from the external sector.  As a result, 
π ρ π= − − +i i * *.  
Assuming that the foreign nominal interest rate and inflation rate equal zero, the objective 
function of the central bank can be written: 
First, we find the welfare-maximizing interest rate taking expectations as given. From the 
first order condition we get, 
i c i
bk
e
= + − +ρ η ζ .
 
As is evident, in setting the nominal interest rate, the central bank responds one for one to risk 
premium shocks but proportionally to money demand shocks.  The key tension that produces 
time inconsistency is that the central bank’s desired setting of the ex-post nominal interest rate 
depends negatively on interest rate expectations, which are formed earlier in the period.   
) - (i
2
b - 
k
 + i - ci = W 2
e ρζη  
  Secondly, on average, those expectations should be correct placing the condition on the 
model that 
Even though both the real interest rate and the inflation target are zero, households will expect a 
positive nominal interest rate, implying that they expect some inflation.  This owes to the 
presence of seigniorage in the objective function.  The greater the weight on the inflation target, 
the smaller will be this inflation premium (as b→∞, then ie →0).  
It is important to note that there are two elements to this premium, owing to the 
importance of seigniorage itself in the objective function and the temptation to generate surprise 
inflation to get extra seigniorage because money demand depends on the expected interest rate.  
If money demand were to depend on the actual interest rate, that second element would be 
eliminated, although the first would alone would still produce inflation in the long run.  It can be 
shown in that circumstance that the expected nominal interest rate would equal 
c
bk2η + ,  
which is smaller than that in the baseline model.  The difference between the two represents, in 
Rogoff’s (1985) term, the premium paid to investors because the central bank succumbs to the 
temptation to cheat systematically.  The irony, of course, in all these models is that systematic 
cheating yields no return. 
The representation for interest rate expectations in the baseline model can be substituted 
into the interest rate equation.  This yields an expression for the optimal setting of the nominal 
.
 + bk
c = ie η  
 interest rate in the presence of shocks to asset holding–namely the risk premium and money 
demand, 
i
bk
c
bk
= + + +ρ
ζ
η .  
Given our assumption that the shocks are uncorrelated, the variance of the domestic nominal 
interest rate is given by: 
 
Note that the variance of the nominal interest rate declines as the commitment to the inflation 
target rises (b is larger) but increases when credibility is low--that is when the variance of risk 
premia shocks are large. Emerging markets are routinely buffeted by large swings in risk premia. 
This is evident, for example, in the volatility of emerging market sovereign credit ratings [see 
Reinhart, 2001].  But still, even under an extreme commitment to an inflation target, nominal 
interest rates will vary as the central bank finds it optimal to offset risk premium shocks. 
The other variables of interest follow directly.  The expected change in the exchange rate 
will be,  
i - ρ, or: 
ε ζ η= + +bk
c
bk
.
 
That is, in setting its nominal interest rate, the central bank will completely offset the effects on 
the exchange rate of foreign risk premium shocks and partially offset money demand shocks.  
The greater the importance of the inflation target, the greater will be the offset of money demand 
kb
 +  = 22
2
2
i
2 σσσ ζρ  
 shocks. 
As a result, the variance of the change in the exchange rate can be written: 
Because risk premium shocks are offset completely, the variance of the exchange rate is 
independent of the variance of the risk premium.  Moreover, the greater the commitment to an 
inflation target, the smaller will be the variance of the change in the exchange rate.  Hence, in 
this setting inflation targeting can explain fear of floating. 
The real domestic monetary base will equal: 
 
 
The level of real balances increases directly with the weight on inflation, in that a stronger 
commitment to low inflation generates a greater willingness to hold real balances.  Real reserves 
also vary one for one with the money demand shock but are invariant to the risk premium shock. 
 The reason, of course, real reserves are invariant to the risk premium shock is that the decision 
by domestic investors to hold money balances depends on the expected, not actual, domestic 
interest rate.   
Given this, the variance of the real monetary base will equal: 
 
As Calvo and Guidotti [1993] point out, the cost of discretionary policy owes to its effect on 
.
kb
 = 22
2
2 σσ ζε  
 expectations, which induce households to change their behavior regarding real magnitudes.  The 
cost of a policy that alters expectations has to be weighed against the possibility of reducing the 
variance of real magnitudes by offsetting shocks realized after expectations are formed.  In our 
framework, smoothing the exchange rate reduces the variation in real outcomes.  Offsetting risk 
premium shocks and thereby damping fluctuations in the exchange rate limits unnecessary 
variations in domestic inflation.  For an inflation targeter, this may be an end that appears 
particularly attractive. 
It is useful to define a variance ratio that captures the variation in the exchange rate 
relative to policy instruments–the domestic nominal interest rate and reserves--a form of 
exchange rate flexibility index.  In particular, 
 
In this model, this terms reduces to: 
Note that this variance ratio goes to 1 as the weight on the inflation target declines.  Conversely, 
as the weight on the inflation target increases, the variance ratio tends to zero.  In the next 
section, we examine the empirical relevance of this issue by contrasting the readings of the 
variance ratio given by equation (19) with the actual inflation performance for the various 
exchange rate arrangement episodes in our sample. 
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 III. An Exchange Rate Flexibility Index: Basic Tests and Comparisons 
We begin this section by conducting some basic tests to assess the extent of foreign 
exchange market intervention (as measured by variability in foreign exchange reserves) in the 
155 episodes that make up our study.  We then proceed to construct an exchange rate flexibility 
index, along the lines suggested by the model in Section III.  In both of these exercises, we 
compare those cases classified as floaters and managed floaters to the benchmark of the 
committed floaters (here taken to be the Australia, Japan, and the United States.)    
III.1. F-tests 
As noted in Section II, as regards exchange rates, interest rates, and other nominal 
variables in the local currency, outliers can significantly distort the variances of some of these 
variables.  In the case of international reserves, which are reported in dollars and less affected by 
periodic mega-devaluations or inflationary spikes, the outlier problem is somewhat less severe.  
Hence, in what follows our emphasis will be on the variability of international reserves--
although in the next subsection we construct a flotation index that is multivariate, as it includes 
the variances of the exchange rate and an interest rate.   
As to the F-tests, the null hypothesis being tested is the equality of variances between the 
committed floaters and the particular country/episode in question; the alternative hypothesis is 
that, if there is fear of floating, the variance of reserves for the episode in question will exceed 
that of the more committed floaters serving as a benchmark.  Hence, it is a one-tailed test. The 
results of the F-tests are summarized in Table 3 19 If the Australian benchmark is used, those 
                                                 
19.  The individual country and episode (there are 155 of these) results are available in the 
background material to this paper at www.puaf.umd.edu/papers/reinhart.htm. 
 episodes classified as floaters the null hypothesis of the equality of variances in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis (consistent with the fear of floating phenomenon) is rejected in 73 percent 
of the cases.  If, instead, Japan is used as a benchmark, the null hypothesis can be rejected for 97 
percent of the cases.  For the managed floaters, there is a similarly high incidence of rejections of 
the null hypothesis.  In effect, in the majority of cases, the variance of foreign exchange reserves 
is several orders of magnitude greater than for Australia, Japan, or the United States.  It is also 
noteworthy that the results of these tests reveal that rejection of the null hypothesis is not 
appreciably different for the floaters than for those with fixed exchange rates or more limited 
flexibility arrangements.  While on the surface this result seems paradoxical, it is consistent with 
both a high incidence of fear of floating among the group classified as floaters and a higher 
incidence of capital controls among the fixers.  If binding, the controls can help stabilize the 
exchange rate without the need of large fluctuations in international reserves. 
Table 3. Proportion of Cases Where the Volatility of Reserves Significantly Exceeds 
  that of the Benchmark Country:  Summary of the F-tests 
 
 
 
Benchmark is: 
 
 
Regime According to 
IMF Classification 
 
 
Number of 
Cases 
 
 
Australia 
 
 Japan 
 
United States 
 
Peg 
 
70 
 
81.4 
 
95.7 
 
92.9  
Limited Flexibility 
 
11 
 
72.7 
 
100 
 
90.9  
Managed Floating 
 
43 
 
76.2 
 
88.4 
 
88.4  
Floating 
 
31 
 
73.3 
 
97.3 
 
87.1  
All 
 
 
155 
 
77.8 
 
93.5 
 
90.9 
 
Notes: The alternative hypothesis, if fear of floating is present, is that the variance in reserves for country 
and episode I is greater than that for the benchmark country, b. Denoting the variance of reserves by σ2R , the 
alternative hypothesis is thus, σ2Ri > σ2Rb .  The individual case-by case results of the F-tests are available from the 
authors at request.   
 III.2. An exchange rate flexibility index 
As discussed, there is no single all-encompassing indicator that provides an adequate 
measure of the extent of exchange rate flexibility allowed by the monetary authorities.  Yet from 
the model developed in Section III, we can motivate the construction of a multivariate index that 
captures different manifestations of the extent of exchange rate variability relative to the 
variability of the instruments that are at the disposal of the monetary authorities stabilize the 
exchange rate.  
As noted earlier, domestic reserves, R, can also be expressed in terms of their asset 
counterparts, which includes foreign exchange reserves, F.  As the results of the F-tests attest to, 
reserve variability is significantly higher for the less committed floaters than for the benchmark 
countries. Furthermore, it is well known that foreign exchange market intervention is 
commonplace in many of the cases studied here.  For this reason, in the empirical application of 
the model we focus on a variance ratio that looks at the central bank balance sheet from the asset 
side, implying that equation (19) should be modified to, 
the values λ can take on range from zero, when there is a peg or a ver high degree of commitment 
to inflation targeting, to 1 when seignorage has a high weight in the policy maker’s objective 
function.  As shown in Table 4, in about 83 percent of the cases the index of exchange rate 
flexibility is below that of Australia--for Japan and the United States the share of cases below 
these two benchmarks is 95 and 90, respectively.  When we disaggregate the advanced economies 
from the emerging market countries, no obvious differences emerge on the proportion of cases 
σσ
σλ
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2
i
2
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 + 
 =  
 that lie below and above the three benchmarks. Separating the two groups does shed light on the 
“causes” behind the high readings.  For the advanced economies, there is no obvious link between 
a high flexibility index reading and high inflation or rising inflation, as is usually the case 
following a currency crisis.  For emerging markets, however, between 66 and 93 percent of the 
cases (depending on whether the Australia or Japan benchmark is used) recording a “higher 
degree of variability” either had inflation rates above 30 percent per annum or the period in 
question is immediately following a currency crisis.  This finding is broadly consistent with the 
model’s predictions that the higher the weight placed on seignorage relative to the inflation target, 
the more variable the exchange rate relative to the instruments of policy, as the shocks to the risk 
premia will not be offset to the same degree if the commitment to an inflation target is not 
binding.  
  
Table 4. Probabilities of “Floating” in Comparison to the Benchmark Country: 
 A Composite Index of Exchange Rate Flexibility 
 
 
 
Benchmark is: 
 
 
Proportion of total cases where:  
Australia 
 
 
 Japan 
 
United States 
 
All countries  
Index is below benchmark 
 
83.0 
 
95.0 
 
90.0  
Index is above benchmark 
 
17.0 
 
5.0 
 
10.0  
Advanced Economies  
Index is below benchmark 
 
78.0 
 
100.0 
 
90.0  
Index is above benchmark 
 
22.0 
 
0.0 
 
10.0  
Of which: high inflation: 30 percent cutoff 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0  
Of which: post-crisis 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0  
Emerging Market Economies  
Index is below benchmark 
 
85.7 
 
91.4 
 
90.0  
Index is above benchmark 
 
14.3 
 
8.6 
 
10.0  
Of which: high inflation 
 
33.0 
 
42.9 
 
42.9  
Of which: post-crisis 
 
 
30.0 
 
50.0 
 
42.9 
 
Source: The authors.  The indices for the individual country episodes at not reported here to economize on space but 
are available at www.puaf.umd.edu/papers/reinhart.htm. 
Notes: The high inflation cutoff is 30 percent or higher during the episode in question; this is in keeping the threshold 
used by Easterly (1998) and others.   
For, the United States, the index uses the US $/DM (subsequently euro) exchange rate; very similar results obtain if 
the US dollar/yen exchange rate is used. 
1 Another 22 percent of the cases above the Australian benchmark were accounted for by the G-3 countries.  
 
 
Furthermore, the mode index level for emerging markets is well below the mode for the 
advanced economies group.  This is also in line with the predictions of the model.  The variance 
of nominal interest rates is determined on a one-to-one basis by the variance of risk premia 
shocks, σρ2 (equation 14)--as discussed earlier risk premia are far more volatile in emerging 
markets than in developed economies. 
 
  IV.  Concluding Remarks 
Announcements of intentions to float, to be sure, are not new.  The Philippines announced 
it would float on January 1988, yet less than ten years later, following its 1997 currency crises, its 
exchange rate policy  would be lumped together with the rest of the affected Asian countries, 
under the commonly-used (but ill-defined) label of a “soft peg.”  Bolivia announced it would float 
on September 1985, owing to its hyperinflation--despite this announcement its exchange rate so 
closely tracked the United States dollar that the regime was reclassified as a managed float on 
January 1998.  Korea and Thailand, despite their relatively new floating status, seem to amass 
reserves at every possible opportunity.20 
While these episodes provide anecdotal evidence that countries may be reluctant to allow 
their currencies to float, the systematic evidence presented in this paper suggests that the fear of 
floating phenomenon is, indeed, widespread and cuts across regions and levels of development.  
Fear of floating–or more generally, fear of large currency swings--is pervasive for a variety of 
reasons, particularly among emerging market countries.  The supposedly disappearing middle 
accounts makes up the predominant share of country practices.  Indeed, one of the hardest 
challenges trying to draw lessons from the experiences of countries that are at the corners is that 
there are so few to study.  The experiences of some of the floaters like the United States and 
Japan may not be particularly relevant for developing countries.  Similarly, the number of 
countries with hard pegs is so small (excluding small islands) that it is difficult to generalize.  
                                                 
20. Of course, one interpretation of these developments is that, burnt by the liquidity shortage faced 
during the 1997-1998 crisis, these countries are seeking to build a “war chest” of international 
reserves so as to avoid having similar problems in the future. 
We have presented evidence in this paper that, when it comes to exchange rate policy, the 
middle has not disappeared.  Yet, there is an apparent change in the conduct of monetary-
 exchange rate policy in many emerging markets--interest rate policy is (at least partially) 
replacing foreign exchange intervention as the preferred means of smoothing exchange rate 
fluctuations.  This is evident in the high variability of interest rates in developing economies and 
in the practices of countries like Mexico and Peru.  The use of interest rate policy to smooth 
exchange rate fluctuations has received considerable attention in recent years, see, for example 
Lahiri and Végh [2000] and references therein. 
Our finding that so many of the episodes that come under the heading of floating exchange 
rates look similar to many of the explicit less flexible exchange rate arrangements may help 
explain why earlier studies, which relied on the official classifications of regimes, failed to detect 
important differences in GDP growth rates and inflation, across peg and the floating regimes.21  
In sum, economic theory provides us with well-defined distinctions between fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes, but we are not aware of any criteria that allows us to discriminate 
as to when a managed float starts to look like a soft peg.  Indeed, the evidence presented in this 
paper suggests it is often quite difficult to distinguish among the two.  On the basis of the 
empirical evidence, perhaps, all that we can say is that, when it comes to exchange rate policy, 
discretion rules the day. 
                                                 
21. See, for instance, Baxter and Stockman [1989], Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, and Wolf [1997] and 
Edwards and Savastano [2000] for a review of this literature. 
 Data Appendix: Definitions and sources 
This appendix describes the data used in this study and their sources. IFS refers to the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. 
1.  Exchange rates: Monthly end-of-period bilateral exchange rates are used. For the European 
countries it is bilateral exchange rates versus the Deutschemark, except pre-1973, where it is 
bilateral rates versus the U.S. dollar. For selected African countries (as noted) bilateral exchange 
rates versus the French Franc are used, while for the remaining countries, which constitute the 
majority it is bilateral rates versus the U.S. dollar.  In all the empirical exercise we focus on 
monthly percent changes.  Source: IFS line ae. 
2.  Reserves: Gross foreign exchange reserves minus gold.   As with exchange rates, all the 
empirical exercise focus on monthly percent changes.  Source: IFS line 1L.d. 
  
3. Nominal Interest Rates: Where possible, policy interest rates were used.  As these vary by 
country, the table below summarizes for each country which interest rate series is used and its 
source. 
4. Real ex-post interest rates: The nominal interest rates listed above deflated using consumer 
prices (IFS line 64) expressed in percentage points. The real interest rate is given by 100 x [((1+ 
it)pt /pt+1-1, where I, is the nominal  interest rate and p are consumer prices. 
  
Country 
 
Interest rate series used 
 
IMF/IFS code 
 
 
Argentina 
 
interbank 
 
60B 
Australia interbank 60B 
Bolivia deposit 60L 
Brazil interbank 60B 
Canada interbank 60B 
Chile deposit 60L 
Colombia discount 60 
Egypt discount 60 
France interbank 60B 
Germany interbank 60B 
Greece t-bill 60C 
India interbank 60B 
Indonesia interbank 60B 
Israel t-bill 60C 
Ivory Coast discount 60 
Japan interbank 60B 
Kenya t-bill 60C 
Malaysia interbank 60B 
Mexico interbank 60B 
New Zealand interbank 60B 
Nigeria t-bill 60C 
Norway interbank 60B 
Pakistan interbank 60B 
Peru discount 60 
Philippines t-bill 60C 
Singapore interbank 60B 
South Africa interbank 60B 
South Korea interbank 60B 
Spain interbank 60B 
Sweden interbank 60B 
Thailand interbank 60B 
Uganda t-bill 60C 
United States federal funds 60B 
Uruguay discount 60 
Venezuela 
 
discount 60 
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 Appendix Table I. Volatility of Selected Indicators in “Limited Flexibility and Fixed”  
 Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 
Probability that the monthly percent change is  
 
 
 in a +/- 2.5 percent band: 
 
 greater than +/- 4 percent:  
 
Country 
 
Period 
 
Exchange Rate 
 
Reserves 
 
Nominal interest rate 
 
 
 “Limited Flexibility” 
 
France 
 
March 1979-November 1999 
 
97.5 
 
54.9 
 
0.8 
 
Greece 
 
January 1998-November 1999 
 
80.0 
 
31.3 
 
0.0 
 
Malaysia 
 
January 1986-February 1990 
 
98.1 
 
35.9 
 
3.9 
 
Spain 
 
June 1989-November 1999 
 
92.4 
 
64.7 
 
0.0 
 
Sweden 
 
June 1985-October 1992 
 
92.1 
 
39.3 
 
3.4 
 
 “Fixed” 
 
Argentina 
 
March 1991-November 1999 
 
100.0 
 
36.7 
 
18.4 
 
Bulgaria 
 
June 1997-November 1999 
 
93.1 
 
48.2 
 
3.57 
 
Cote D’Ivoire 
 
January 1970-November 1999 
 
99.4 
 
8.7 
 
0.0 
 
Estonia 
 
June 1992-November 1999 
 
100.0 
 
32.6 
 
5.7 
 
Kenya 
 
January 1970-September 1993 
 
85.6 
 
20.8 
 
1.5 
 
Lithuania 
 
April 1994-November 1999 
 
100.0 
 
37.3 
 
19.4 
 
Malaysia 
 
March 1990-November 1992 
 
96.9 
 
39.4 
 
0.0 
 
Nigeria 
 
April 1993-November 1999 
 
98.6 
 
8.9 
 
1.4 
 
Norway 
 
December 1978-November 
1992 
 
86.8 
 
35.1 
 
6.5 
 
Singapore 
 
January 983-December 1987 
 
96.6 
 
83.3 
 
0.0 
 
Thailand 
 
 
January 1970-June 1997 
 
98.5 
 
50.2 
 
2.4 
 
Notes: Recent pegs episodes with few monthly observations are Malaysia in September 1998 and Egypt in January 1999. 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
